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WAR crimes trials, whether conducted by tribunals established 
under international agreement, like that at Nuremberg, 1 or under
municipal law, like that which rendered the decision regarding the 
Llandovery Castle, 2 as well as trials under national military law, 
like that of Lieutenant Calley, 3 inevitably raise a multitude of 
legal problems. Among the most important of these is the knowl­
edge of the accused. Too often, insufficient attention is paid to 
this, even though the inevitable defence of superior orders and the 
reaction to it of the tribunal concemed4 to a very great extent are 
based on this factor, since success or otherwise of the plea de­
pends on whether or not the act ordered was palpably or manifestly 
illegal, which obviously depends on the accused's knowledge of 
what is in f act lawful. If the writer's experience on joining the 
British Army during the Second World War is anything to go by, the 
extent of the knowledge of the law of the ordinary soldier stems 
rather from his own resources than those of the military establish­
ment. While he was told that, as a prisoner of war, the Geneva 
Convention of 19295 merely required him to give his name, number 
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and rank, he was never given any instruction as to the rights of 
enemy personnel, his duties towards them or the nature of illegal 
weapons or acts of war. Moreover, it would appear that in some 
armies the situation has probably not changed too radically. Thus, 
in one of the courts martial arising out of -the operations of United 
States personnel during the Korean War it was held that even 
though the acts perpetrated by the accused were in keeping with 
the training received during basic training, this would not provide 
a defence if the order concerned was palpably illegal on its face.6 
It is difficult to expect the ordinary soldier to know what orders 
he is permitted and required to obey, or the officer what orders he 
is allowed to give, without in either case running the risk of trial 
for breach of the law of war, if he does not know what that law is. 
While it may be true that most systems of criminal law postulate 
the maxim ignoran tia juris quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem 
excusat, 7 it must not be forgotten that those who live within a
national system of law may be presumed to accept the national 
ethic and to be aware of the nature and basic principles of their 
country's criminal code, or at least kn ow where to find them. This 
is hardly the case in so far as international law is concerned. This 
is a highly sophisticated system parts of which are controversial , 
and this is particularly true of that part of it which relates to the 
law of war. After all, the soldier understands that his task is to 
kill his enemy, that the aim of his country is to subdue that enemy, 
and it may seem somewhat strange to him that while his act and 
the purpose for which it is done are both lawful, nevertheless he 
is only allowed to carry out this act in a particular way and in ac­
cordance with certain rules, which rules are often abstruse, com-
plex in form and certainly difficult co find. It is important, there­
fore, to examine the extent to which states are obliged to inform 
their armed forces of the law of war and to refer, if possible, to 
the steps and methods which have been or ought to be taken to 
this end. 
In looking at this problem it must be borne in mind that interna­
tional law is made up of treaties, customary law and, nowadays to 
an increasing extent, judicial decisions. Al so, unlike municipal 
law, international law is, in theory at least, universally appli· 
cable and the law of one country's courts in this field has asmuch 
6 
V. S. v. Keenan (1969) 39 C.M. R. 108.
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validity as that of any other country. As it was so aptly put by 
Vattel: 8 
'Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and 
obligations the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, 
which are composed of men and may be regarded as so many 
free persons living together in a state of nature, are by nature 
equal and hold from nature the same obligations and the same 
rights. Strength or weakness, in this case, counts for nothing. 
A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no 
less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom.' 
It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine where this equally 
applicable law is to be found and the extent to which it imposes 
an obligation upon its subjects co ensure that it is made known to 
their nationals. With treaties the situation is relatively straight­
forward. All that is required is co determine which are the relevant 
documents and then to examine the terms of those treaties. How­
ever, to a very great extent these treaties are simply codifications 
of customary law and, in so far as they are not themselves law­
creative, the only obligation that rests upon non-parties is to be 
derived from that customary law. For the most part, it has been 
generally said chat the law of war is co be found in the Hague 
Conventions of 1907 as amended by the various Red Cross Geneva 
Conventions of 1929 and 1949.9 However, even the Hague Conven­
tions themselves refer co 'the laws and customs of war' and at 
times do not spell out in excessive detail what even the treaty 
law entails. Thus, all that Hague Convention IV10 with respect to 
the laws and customs of war on land says about penalties for 
violations of the Regulations attached thereto is to be found in 
Article 3: 
'A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said 
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay com­
pensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by 
persons forming part of its armed forces.' 
There is no provision for personal liability or for punishment of 
the soldier who actually commits the violation. Toe only basis on 
which such individuals can therefore be tried is either their own 
municipal law which would not, of course, extend t o  an enemy, or 
8
Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Natu.relle (1758), Bk.I, 
Intro., s. 18 (Carnegie tr., 1916, vol. 3, p. 7 - italucs added). 
9 
See Schindler and Toman, op. cit. 
10Ibid., 57.
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customary international law, just as non-military personnel who 
indulge in warlike acts are similarly liable as war criminals under 
the same customary law. In the first edition of his International
Law
11 Oppenheim says: 
'according to a generally recognised customary rule of Interna­
tional Law hostile acts on the part of private individuals are 
not acts of legitimate warfare, and the offenders can be treated 
and punished a:� war criminals. Even those writers who object to 
the term "criminals" do not deny that such hostile acts by pri­
vate individuals, in contradistinction to hostile acts by mem­
bers of the armed forces, may be severely punished. The con­
troversy whether or not such acts may be styled "crimes" is
again only one of terminology; materially the rule is not at all 
controverted.' 
Although, in this passage Oppenheim apparently excludes from his 
concept of war crimes 'hostile acts by members of the armed for­
ces', he points out that 'belligerents have not an unlimited right 
as to the means they adopt for injuring the enemy', 12 and com­
ments13 that: 
'the roots of the present Laws of War are to be traced back to 
practices of belligerents which arose and grew gradually during 
the latter part of the Middle Ages. The unsparing cruelty of the 
war practices during the greater part of the Middle Ages began 
gradually to be modified through the influence of Christianity 
and chivalry.' 
At this juncture it might be useful to draw attention to the 147 4 
trial of Peter of Hagenbach at Breisach. 14 As Governor for the 
Duke of Burgundy Hagenbach established a 
'regime of arbitrariness and terror [ which] extended to murder, 
rape, illegal taxation and wanton confiscation of private pro­
perty, and the victims of his depradations included inhabitants 
of neighbouring territories as well as Swiss merchants on their 
way to and from the Frankfurt fair.' 
After Hagenbach's capture, the Archduke of Austria, as sovereign 
of Breisach, set up a tribunal of 28 judges from the Allied towns, 
11 Vol. 2 (1906), 63.
12Ib id., 114 (citing Art. 22 of Hague Regulations of 1899, Schindler/
Toman, 76). 
13 1 bid. 
' 
7 4. 
14 Schwarzenberger, lnte,rnatipnal Law, vol. 2, The Law of Armed Conflict
( 1968) ch. 39. 
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and at his trial the accused pleaded that everything he had done 
had been on the orders of his master, but the prosecution alleged 
that he had 'trampled under foot the laws of G od and man '. The 
tribunal was of opinion that to accept such a defence would be 
contrary to the laws of God and, since the crimes were estab­
lished beyond doubt, sentenced Hagenbach to death. In many ways 
the charge with its reference to the laws of God and of man seems 
like a predecessor of the provision of the Treacy of Versailles 
aimed at bringing the Kaiser to trial: 15 
'The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II 
of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme of­
fence against international morality and the sanctity of trea­
ties •.. 
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest mo­
tives of international pdicy, with a view to vindicating the 
solemn obligations of international undertakings and the val· 
idity of international morality.' 
While the Treaty called for the establishment of a specially es­
tablished international tribunal, it did not specify the law which 
this tribunal would apply and by which the offences were to be 
judged. A somewhat similar hiatus is apparent in the Treaty pro­
vision 16 concerning the trial by military tribunals of 'persons
accused of having committed violation of the laws and customs of 
war', who if found guilty are to 'be sentenced to punishments laid 
down by law'. While the Treaty does not indicate what law it has 
in mind, the Reichsgericht which delivered the Llandovery Castle 
judgment 17 was clearly aware that it was operating in accordance 
with international law: 
' ... The firing on the boats was an offence against the law of 
nations ... Any violation of the law of nations in warfare is ... 
a punishable offence, so far as, in general, a penalty is at­
tached to the deed. The killing of enemies in war is in ac­
cordance with the law of the State that makes war ... , only in 
so f ar as such killing is in accordance with the conditions and 
limitations imposed by the Law of Nations. The f act that his 
deed is a violation of International Law must be well known to 
the doer, apart from acts of carelessness, in which careless 
ignorance is a sufficient excuse. In examining the existence of 
15 (1919) Art. 227 (112 B.F.S.P. 1; 13 Am. J. Int'l Law (1919), Supp.). 
16 Art. 228.
17
Loc. cit. 
1 
n. 2 above. 
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this knowledge, the ambiguity of many of the rules of Interna­
cional Law, as well as the actual circumstances of the case, 
must be borne in mind, because in wartime decisions of great 
importance ha ;e frequently to be made on very insufficient 
material. This consideration, however, cannot be applied to the 
case at present before the Court. The rule of International Law, 
which is here involved [regarding the sinking of the hospital 
ship and the firing on the boats of the survivors], is simple and 
universally known. No possible doubt can exist with regard to 
the question of its applicability. The Court must in this in­
stance affirm [ the commander's] guilt of killing contrary to 
Internacional Law ... ' 
Perhaps the earliest codification of the law of war was that pre­
pared by Professor Lieber of Columbia University, during the 
American Civil War and promulgated by President Lincoln in 
1863. 18 This reflects what was generally understood by the Euro­
pean states as constituting the law at the time and clearly pro­
vides for the trial and punishment of a variety of specified offen­
ces committed by troops against the inhabitants of invaded terri­
tory, but it makes no reference to the need to ensure that members 
of the United States armed forces are made aware of what they may 
and what they may not do, although by and large the offences 
listed are those which would be found in any national penal code. 
The first call for recognition of the need to inform the armed for­
ces of the rules of war is to be found in the Oxford Manual pre­
pared by the Institute of International Law at its Oxford meeting in 
1880. 19 In the Preface the Institute states why it has drawn up its 
statement of the laws of war on land: 
'By so doing, it believes it is rendering a service to military 
men themselves. In fact so long as the demands of opinion re­
main indeterminate, belligerents are exposed to painful uncer­
tainty and endless accusations. A positive set of rules, on ·the 
contrary, if they are judicious, serves the interests of belli­
gerents and is far from hindering them, since by preventing the 
unchaining of passion and savage instincts - which battle 
always awakens, as much as it awakens courage and manly 
18 U.S. Adjutant General's Office, General Orders No. 100 (Schindler/ 
Toman, 3). 
19 lnstitut de Droit International, Tableau general des resolutions, 187.3-
1956 ( 1957), 180; Scott, Resolutions of the Institute of Int' l Law ( 1916) 
26; Schindler/Toman, 35). 
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virtues, - it strengthens the discipline which is the strength of 
armies; it also ennobles their patriotic mission in the .eyes of 
the soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to 
the rights of humanity. But in order to attain this end it is not 
sufficient for sovereigns to promulgate new laws. It is essen­
tial, too, that they make these laws known among all people, so 
that when a war is declared, the men called upon to cake up 
arms to defend the causes of the belligerent States, may be 
thoroughly impregnated with the special rights and duties at­
tached to the execution of such a command. The Institute, with 
a view to assisting the authorities in accomplishing this part of 
their t ask, has given its work a popular form, attaching thereto 
statements of the reasons therefor, from which the text of a law 
may be easily secured when desired.' 
While the text of the Oxford Manual seems to satisfy the expressed 
desire of achieving a 'popular form', it must not be overlooked that 
the ordinary person, civilian or military, was unlikely to seek this
document out. Furthermore, while the Institute might have been 
composed of the most eminent international lawyers of the day, it 
must not be forgotten that it was,as it is n ow, an unofficial 
learned society whose proposals possessed no binding force and 
could only aim at providing suggestions acceptable to govern-
ments which would carry them into law. It would appear that, des­
pite the expressed desire of the Institute, little was done to make 
the contents of the Manual known to members of the armed forces. 
Even when countries started issuing Manuals of Military Law with 
sections devoted to the law of war, these manuals were not issued 
to the troops or even all officers, and in many cases non-officers 
were actively discouraged from seeking access to them. 
To some extent the voeu of the Institute had an effect. In Hague 
Convention II of 189920 it was clearly provided in Article I that 
'The High Contracting Parties shall issue instructions to their 
armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the •Reg­
ulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land" an· 
nexed to the present Convention.' 
and the same provision was repeated in the IV Convention of 1907 .21 
The only other Hague Convention to deal with dissemination is
No. X of 190722 for the Adaptation to Maritime Warf are of the 
20 Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907
( 1918), 100 (Schindler/Toman, 57). 
21Ibid
22 Art. 20, Scott, op. ci.t., 163 (Schindler/Toman, 235).
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Principles of the Geneva Convention cf 186423 which related to 
the amelioration of conditions of the wounded and sick of armies 
in the field. In its form, however, it differed from the wording in 
Convention IV and appeared co lay more emphasis on the knowl­
edge of those who were to be protected than of those whose con­
duct was restricted: 
'The Signatory Powers shall cake the necessary measures for 
bringing the provisions of the present Convention to the knowl­
edge of their naval forces, and especially of the members en­
titled thereunder co immunity, and for making them known co the 
public.' 
Although other Conventions agreed at the Hague dealt with such 
issues as the rights of neutrals and naval bombardment, .the sig­
natories apparently did not consider it necessary co include a 
provision seeking co ensure that the rules and prohibitions were 
made known to the personnel who were most directly affected and 
upon whose conduct it was necessary to rely to ensure compliance. 
Perhaps even more surprising is the silence in this matter of 
the Rules regarding Air Warfare 24 drafted by the Commission of 
Jurists called for by the 1922 Conference of Washington. Although 
chis goes into detail as to what may and may not be done in aerial 
warfare - the fact that the Rules were never ad <peed is irrelevant, 
especially as 'to a great extent, they correspond to the customary 
rules and general principles underlying the conventions on the 
law of war on land and at sea' 25 - the members of the Commission 
apparently did not consider it necessary for the states which 
might adopt these Rules to undertake any commitment to make 
chem known co their respective air forces. Equally strange is the 
silence of the Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilians 
against New Engines of War drawn up by the Internacional Law 
Association at Amsterdam in 1938. 26 
In what has now come co be described as humanitarian law in 
armed conflict, the Internacional Committee of the Red Cross has 
consistently endeavoured to ensure chat treaties relating to the 
wounded and sick or prisoners of war contain provisions obligating 
the parties co inform their personnel of the commitments involved. 
Article 27 of the 1929 Convention on the Amelioration of the Con-
231 Am. J. Int'l Law (1907), Supp. 90 (Schindler/Toman, 203). 
241923, i 7 Am. J. lnt'l Law (1923), Supp. 24 5 (Schindle r/ Toman, 139).
25 Ibid., 139; see, also, 2 Oppenheim, International Law (7th ed., 1952),
519; Spaight, Air Power and War Rights ( 1947) 42-3. 
26I.L.A., Report of 4JJth Conference, 40 (Schindler/Toman, 155).
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dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field 27 is remin­
iscent of Hague Convention X, for it reads: 
tThe High Contracting Parties shall take the necessary steps to 
instruct their troops, and in particular the personnel protected, 
in the provisions of the present Convention, and to bring them to 
the notice of the civil population.' 
A somewhat similar concern with the interest of those protected 
is to be found in the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention, 28 for by 
Article 84 the text of this Convention is to be posted, 'whenever 
possible, in the native language of the prisoners of war, in places 
where it may be consulted by all the prisoners'. It even has to be 
communicated, when so requested, to prisoners 'who are unable to 
inform themselves of the text posted'. Presumably, it is antici­
pated that those responsible for the prisoners of war will be suf­
ficiently acquainted with the t erms of the Convention by such 
posting - that is, if they can read the language of the prisoners -
for there is no obligation on the parties to make the terms known 
to their own personnel. 
A somewhat new departure is to be found in the revised texts of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which resulted from the desire of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross to bring the 1929 
texts up to date, taking into consideration the experiences learned 
during the Second World War. Article 47 of the Convention on 
Wounded and Sick in the Field, 29 and Article 48 of that on Woun­
ded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 30 are 
much wider than their precursors, reflecting recognition of the fact 
that modern armies are frequently conscript in character and their 
personnel should, to the extent that that is possible, be aware of 
their obligations before enlistment, and certainly before the out­
break of hostilities: 
'The High Contracting Parties undert ake, in time of peace as in 
time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention 
as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in par­
ticular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of 
military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the prin­
ciples thereof may become known to the entire population, in 
particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel 
and the chaplains.' 
27 
5 Hudson, Inte.rnational Legislatipn (19 36), 1 (Schindler/Toman, 247). 
28 ibid., 20 (Schindler/Toman, 261). 
29 75 UNTS 31 (Schindler/Toman, 295). 
30
Ibid.. 85 (323). 
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The 1949 Conventions on Prisoners of War31 and the Treaonent of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War32 take due account of their spec­
ialist character: 
Art. 127, Ps W - 'The High Contracting Parties undertake, in 
time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the 
present Convention as widely as possible in their respective 
countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in 
their progr ammes of military and, if possible, civil ·instruction, 
so that the princi ples thereof may become known to all their 
armed forces and to the entire population. 
Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume 
responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the 
text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its pro­
visions.' 
The High Contracting Parties are bound to enact any legislation 
necessary to give penal effect to the Convention and, by Article 
128, 
'shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal 
Council and, during hostilities, through the Protecting Powers, 
the official translations of the present Convention, as well as 
the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the ap­
plication thereof.' 
The 1929 provision with regard to the posting of the Convention 
has been extended so that all regulations and orders must be in a 
language that the prisoners can understand. 
The first paragraph of Article 144 of the Civilians Convention is 
in the same terms as Article 127 of the Prisoners of War Conven­
tion, but it proceeds: 
'Any civilian, military, police or other authorities, who in time
of war assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons, 
must possess the text of the Convention and be specially in-
structed as to its provisions,' 
and the same requirement respecting intercommunication of legis­
lation appears in Article 145. 
At the present time there has been some widening of the concept 
of non-military objectives and a treaty now exists for the Protec­
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 33 It can­
not be denied that in the past the military have not been over-
31 lbid, 135 (345). 
32Ibid, 287 (417). 
33 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (Schindler/Toman, 525). 
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scrupulous in respecting cultural property and at times occupying 
forces have not hesitated to destroy monuments in the territory of 
their enemy. Moreover, states have on occasion considered that 
modernisation is perhaps more important than the preservation of 
those national cultural monuments which might constitute part of 
'the cultural heritage of every people.' Cultur al property is defined 
as: 
'(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the 
cul rural heritage of every people, such as monuments of archi­
tecture, art or history, whether religious or secular, archeolo gi­
cal sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of histori ­
cal or artistic interest; wo.tks of art; manuscripts; books and 
other objects of artistic, historical or archeological interest; as 
well as scientific collections and important collections of books 
or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above; 
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or
exhibit the movable cultur al property defined in sub-paragraph
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositaries of ar­
chives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed
conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph
(a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as
defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) to be known as "centres
containing monuments".'
This definition is so comprehensive and yet so vague that it is 
clear some measures of dissemination to inform the military and 
others concerned will be absolutely vital if the Convention is to 
have any meaning. The draftsmen seem to have been aware of this 
need, for there are two provisions relating to dissemination which 
to some extent are repetitive: 
Art. 7 - 'The High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in 
time of peace into their military regulations such provisions as 
may ensure observance of the present Convention, and to foster 
in the members of their armed forces a spirit for the culture and 
cultural property of all peoples. The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to plan or establish in peacetime, within their armed 
forces, services or specialist personnel whose purpose will be 
to secure respect for cultur al property and to co-operate with 
civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it.' 
Art. 25 - 'The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of 
peace as in time of armed conflict, to disseminate the text of 
the present Convention and the Regulations for it s execution as 
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widely as possible in their respective countries. They under­
take, in particular, to include the study thereof in their pro­
grammes of military and, if possible, civilian training, so that 
its principles are made known to the whole population, espec­
ially the armed forces and personnel engaged in the protection 
of cul cur al property.' 
It is obvious that the only way such 'property of great impor­
tance to the cultural heritage of every people' can be protected 
without the items becoming so numerous and trivial as to be ridi­
culous - for every person's idea of what constitutes such property 
from the point of view of, for example, art is likely to be highly 
subjective - will be by the compilation of agreed lists that will be 
available to the armies in the field. Such lists are envisaged, but 
later experience suggests that these may perhaps not be available 
by the time armed conflict begins and, as became clear at the 1976 
session of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in 
Armed Conflict, it can easily happen that one belligerent is so 
determined not to recognise its adversary, that it will not even 
agree to the compilation of such lists if it means that co-operation 
is in any way necessary with what is now known as the 'adverse 
party' rather than the 'enemy'. 
In the years since the Second World War most of the armed con­
flicts which have occurred have been non-international, so that 
generally speaking there have been no rules of international law, 
with the possible exception of the minimal rules of humanity, ap­
plicable, for states have traditionally relied upon the argument 
that civil wars and the like are matters of domestic jurisdiction 
with which the rest of the world has no concern. And this principle 
is confirmed by Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations 
unless there is a threat to international peace. 34 However, an 
early effort at bringing civil war situations within the purview of 
international law is to be found in the Nyon Agreement of 1937 35 
aimed at suppressing unlawful submarine attacks upon merchant 
ships trading with ports under the control of, primarily, the Spanish 
34 (Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are es sen ti ally within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this provision shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII 
[ with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of 
aggression]., 
35181 LNTS 137 (Schindler/Toman, 667).
48 
Government. By Article 1: 
'The participating Powers will instruct their naval forces to 
take the action indicated in paragraphs II and III below with a 
view to the protection of all merchant ships not belonging to 
either of the conflicting Spanish parties.' 
While it may be a:gued by the purist that this is not really directed 
at imparting rules of humanitarian behaviour to the citizens or 
military personnel of any contracting party, in the sense that he 
may need to know the law in order to defend himself, it is never­
theless an instance of an international obligation that requires 
states parties to the agreement to inform their personnel of the new 
law that has been created and which they would be required to 
observe and carry through. 
It became clear in Korea and Vietnam that the law of war as it 
had been drawn up at the Hague and Geneva was now out of date. 
For one thing, there was no provision with regard, for example, to 
ambulance aircraft, and when the International Red Cross Com­
mittee drew up its draft proposals for amendments to the 1949 law 
to be presented to a diplomatic conference on humanitarian law in 
armed conflict, it decided to take the opportunity, to bring, in so 
far as it could, the traditional law up to date, as well as to at­
tempt to ext end at least the basic principles of humanitarian law 
to non-international conflicts too. This is not the place to discuss 
the proposals embodied in the two draft Protocols intended to be 
additions to the Geneva Protocols and aimed at achieving this 
end. We are concerned solely with the problem of dissemination 
and enlightenment of those likely to be called upon to give effect 
to the new rules, whether they be described as part of the law of 
wars or rules of humanitarian law. Before looking at the provisions 
of the draft Protocols it should be point ed out that it matters 
little· what conventions say or require, if the states which are 
parties to them do not ensure that their military personnel are in 
fact sufficiently aware of their provisions and understand what is 
required of them as not to be likely to breach their provisions. The 
operations in Korea and Vietnam and the United States courts 
martial arising therefrom36 indicate that there was something 
gravely lacking in the education being given to United States 
armed forces, and perhaps indicating that not enough emphasis 
was being imparted to officers to indicate that the United States 
36 See, e.g., Green, 'Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man', 8 Can.
Y.B. Int'l Law ( 1970), 61, 96 et seqq.; Superior Orders in National and 
International Law ( 1976), 126 et seqq. 
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accepted the view expressed in Article 22 of the Hague Regula· 
tions that 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited', even though this article is reprinted in the 
United States Department of the Army Field Manual on the Law of 
Land Warf are, 37 accompanied by the comment: 
'The means employed [in injuring the enemy] are definitely res• 
tricted by international declarations and conventions and by the 
laws and usages of war.' 
It is perhaps because of what happened in these two theatres that 
the United States military authorities thereafter issued a variety 
of pamphlets on the teaching of the law of war to the armed for­
ces. 38 However inadequate these might be, 39 they show a deter­
mination to make some effort to ensure that American troops have 
at least some knowledge of what they may and may not do during 
armed conflict. As a result, where they are concerned there may 
now be some validity in upholding the validity of the ignorantia
juris maxim. 
Among the new departures adopted by the Geneva Conference on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, and the potential significance 
of which has already been made clear, is the provision in Proto· 
col I concerning the protection of journalists.40 This aims at giving 
journalists who are not accredited war correspondents some pro· 
tection by means of an identity card to ensure that when captured 
they are treated as civilians. Obviously, members of the armed 
forces will have to be aware of the nature of this card and know 
that any attempt by them to use such an identity certificate would 
amount to a breach of the law of war. In fact the British Govern· 
ment has now ceased the practice in Northern Ireland of having 
soldiers in civilian clothing passing themselves off as regular 
journalists, thus indulging in a form of 'perfidy', while at the 
37Dept. of the Army, FM27-10 (1956), para. 33.
38Dept. of the Army, 27-200, 'The Law of Land Warfare - A Self-Instruc­
tional Text' ( 1972); ASubjScd 27-1 ( 1970), 'The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907' (2-hour lecture course). 
39 For criticisms see Green, 'Aftermath of Vietnam: War Law and the 
Soldier', 4 Falk, The Vietnam War and International Law - The Con­
cluding Phase (1976), 147, 168 et seqq.) 
40 Art. 79, see 16 lnt'l Legal Materials (1977), Pr. I, 1391, Pr.II, 1442 -
for discussion of these Protocols , see Green, 'The New Law of Armed 
Conflict', 15 Can. Y .B. l.L. {1977). 
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same time endangering true journalists entitled to such cards and 
the civilian status concomitant therewith. 41 
In so far as Protocol I relating co international armed conflicts 
is concerned, the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law accep­
ted a number of proposals regarding disseminacion: 42
Art. 8 2 - 'The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the 
Pa rties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure 
chat legal advisers are available, when necessary, co advise 
military commanders at the appropriate level on the application 
of the [Geneva] Conventions and chis Protocol and on the ap­
propriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this sub­
ject.' 
Art. 83 - 1( 1) The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time 
of peace as in time of armed conflict, to disseminate the Con­
ventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their res­
pective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof 
in their programmes of military instruction and to encourage the 
study thereof by the civilian population, so that chose instru­
ments may become known to the armed forces and co the civilian 
population. (2) Any military or civilian authorities who, in time 
of armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect of the ap­
plication of the Conventions and chis Protocol shall be fully ac-
quainted with the text thereof. 
A number of points arise in connection with these proposals. In 
the fir st place, Article 82 implies that some of the officers at­
tached to the judge advocate division of a military force should be 
knowledgeable in at least that part of the law of war that may be 
described as humanitarian law. Such a requirement would almost 
certainly necessitate a revision of the training afforded by the rel­
evant military services and perhaps also the placing of a greater 
emphasis on the international law of war with particular reference 
to the principles of humanitarian law in armed conflict.43 The reason 
that states are only required to 'encourage' civilian study of these 
principles is to be found in the constitutional difficulties confront­
ing some federal states where education is not within the central 
government's competence, and also to preserve the position in 
41See Green, letter on cJ:ournalists in Battle Areas', The Times (London)
1 Mar. 1976. 
42 
Loe, cit,, n. 40 above.
43See, Green, cThe Role of Legal Advisers in the Armed Forces', 7 Israel
Y .B. on Human Rights ( 1977). 
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those countries where independence is demanded by such educa­
tional authorities as universities in so far as their curricula and 
teaching programmes are concerned. There can be little doubt that, 
even if these provisions are conscientiously carried out, milit ary 
commanders will have to recognise that, while their function may 
be to conduct hostilities with a view to the early defeat of the 
enemy, regulation of the conduct of the men in their command so as 
to ensure compliance with the law and it s restrictions is a funda­
mental obligation, as well as a policy matter of importance to 
national dignity. If this occurs, there are likely to be less trans­
gressions of the law and certainly fewer opportunities for those 
accused of breaches to plead ignorance in their defence. However, 
there is inherent in the provisions the assumption that proper edu­
cational programmes, at least of the military, conducted by pro­
perly qualified persons will be instituted. This draws attention to 
activities already commenced in cooperation with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross by the Institut Henri Dunant in Gen­
eva. Under the direction of Professor Pictet, who is also Vice 
President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
lnstitut has introduced a number of courses in humanitarian law in 
armed conflict which have already been attended by members of 
the armed forces from various countries, as well as by graduate 
students. In addition, the lnstitut is anxious to organise seminars 
for interested parties and on a regional basis, and is receiving en­
couragement and cooperation particularly from some of the devel­
oping countries. Where developed countries are concerned, diffi­
culties are encountered in view of historical backgrounds and a 
desire to follow their own tradition. 
Problems of a somewhat different kind arise concerning Proto­
col II which deals with non-international armed conflicts. In so f ar 
as the regular armed forces are concerned, their position· is al­
ready governed by the provisions of Protocol I just referred to, 
although it could easily be argued that since Protocol I only deals 
with international conflicts, any education in relation thereto, is
completely irrelevant for non-international conflicts. Specific 
steps must therefore be taken to ensure that no such escape from 
the obligation to observe humanitarian law is possible. In the 
event of a non�intemacional conflict, however. one of the contes­
tants is likely to be recruited primarily from civilians, as well as 
dissident members of the anned forces. If the Protocol is co have 
any meaning and come into operation immediately upon the conflict 
becoming sufficiently serious to be considered an armed conflict 
rather than a riot or a minor insurrection, it will be necessary for 
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the civilian population to be educated in the basic principles of 
humanitarian law as part of the country's ordinary educational pro­
gramme and regardless of the likelihood of any conflict arising. 
However, any attempt co postulate an intemational obliga tion 
requiring states to educate their subjects as to their rights and 
duties in time of civil war or other .non-international armed con­
flict may easily be construed as an attempt to interfere in the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state. Moreover, it smacks of encourage­
ment to dissidents to resort to armed conflict, secure in the 
knowledge that the government is subject to restrictions on its
freedom in restoring order and re-establishing its authority, having 
already taught those who are now opposed to the government ex­
actly what rights they will be entitled to, and which might limit 
the normal operation of the criminal law, should they decide to 
resort to armed force. In fact, at Geneva this proposal met with 
opposition from some Latin American countries, where it might be 
thought that their past history suggests a real likelihood of non­
international conflict breaking out with the resultant creation of a 
Protocol II situation. A further objection was raised by the Soviet 
Union which contended that any obligation to educate its civilian 
population along such lines would be contrary to the prohibition 
contained in the Law on the Defence of Peace44 which forbids war 
propaganda in whatever form it is carried out, arguing further that 
such education would also be contrary to the Soviet commitment to 
educate for peaceful purposes. Despite these reservations, the 
Geneva Conference adopted at its 1976 session Articles 36 and 37 
of Protocol II: 45
Art. 36 - 'Each Party to the confli ct shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure the observance of this Protocol by its mil­
itary and civilian agents and persons subject to its control.' 
Art. 37 - '( 1) The High Contracting Parties undertake to dis­
seminate the present Protocol as widely as possible in time of 
peace, so that it may become known to the armed forces and to 
the civilian population. 
(2) In time of armed conflict, the Parties to the conflict shall
take appropriate measures to. bring the provisions of the present
Protocol to the knowledge of their military and civilian agents
and persons subject to their control.'
This provision perhaps sounds highly reasonable, but it must be 
44 21 Mar. 1951, c. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (1974), 85-6. 
45 1.C.R.C., Doc. D 1388/1 b (1976).
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recognized that the anti-government forces will not be a party to 
the Protocol which is only intended to be open for signature or 
accession by parties to the Geneva Conventions, and these are, 
of course, states. It would mean, therefore, that unless this con­
testant makes a statement accepting the obligations of the Proto­
col, there is imposed upon the government a unilateral obligation 
as to its operations in re-establishing its authority and, more­
over, a requirement to inform the military and the civilians sup­
porting it of their duty to observe the provisions of the Protocol, 
even though their opponents are not so doing. On the other hand, 
it might be argued that by becoming a party a state accepts the 
obligations for all its citizens, so that during a non-international 
conflict even its opponents are, legally at least, still bound by 
the state's international undertakings. This one-sidedness of 
burdens may therefore be more apparent than real. Cynics, how­
ever, might prefer the less liberal approach. It should also be 
noticed that, unlike the position under Article 83 of Protocol I, 
there was no reference to the inclusion of the teaching of Protocol II 
in military curricula. The reason for this was that some countries 
were unwilling, in connection with a non-international conflict, to 
accept directions as to the precise method by which their armed 
forces were to be informed of their Protocol II obligation. Event­
ually, in Protocol II as finally adopted, these provisions were re­
placed by Article 20, which simply scares that 'chis Protocol shall 
be disseminated as widely as possible'. 
There can be little doubt that if the states parties to the Gen­
eva Conventions and the two amending Protocols take their obli­
gations regarding dissemination seriously, and in fact introduce 
proper educational programmes, there would be more realisation 
by both the armed forces and the civilian population that there is 
in fact a real law of war carrying as much risk of punishment in 
the event of its breach, as is the case with national criminal law. 
At the same time, no member of the field forces would be able to 
contend, if charged with a breach of the law, that not only was he 
unaware of the existence of a particular rule, but that no attempt 
had ever been made to enlighten him. Moreover, military com­
manders would have to rethink their attitudes to the whole con­
spectus of the law of war and give it -its due and proper place in 
military training. In so far· as the civilian population is concerned, 
if the obligations are to be fully carried out, both as regards 
Protocol I and Protocol II, there would be a need for govern­
ments to rethink the nature of their educational programmes, des-
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pite the possibility that schools and pacifists among the teaching 
staffs may offer real objections. It may well be that there would 
have to be some measure of cooperation between civilian educa­
tion authorities and the military. Since this would almost cer­
tainly be rejected in many countries, use might have to be made of 
the personnel of the national Red Cross Society. But this too 
would often mean a rethinking of the entire approach and philos­
ophy of such Society. For the main part, the members of the na­
tional Society are concerned with internal medical auxiliary aid 
programmes and the offer of assistance in the event of national 
and sometimes international catastrophes, but they are hardly 
concerned with problems of armed conflict or the law relating 
thereto. Perhaps, if they were able to enlist qualified persons, 
and this again raises the problems of cooperation with the military 
or at least of the legal branch, this would be .reasonable. Other­
wise, it must be remembered that the international law of peace 
and war, as well as the principles of humanitarian law, is highly 
technical and the terms of treaties are often ambiguous if not 
actually obtuse. For unqualified persons to attempt to educate 
others on their meaning may be just as dangerous as the absence 
of any education at all. 
While in the past it might have been possible for any state to 
argue that while common sense dictated it should educate its 
troops in the law of war, the legal obligation so to do was some­
what nebulous and rather in the nature of a pious hope. Now, 
however, the obligation is clearly laid. down. What ·may still be 
necessary is the establishment of some observation centre or 
clearing house which might be able to oversee and advise whether 
this is being carried into effect in a reasonable manner such that 
ordinary soldiers may understand, while a bare minimum may be 
presumed as equally accepted by all services regardless of arm or 
nationality. To some extent this is being attempted by the Henri 
Dunant Institut, while the International Committee of the Red 
Cross may be expected to continue to issue pamphlets outlining 
the basic minima of obligations in the field of humanitarian law. 
These educational activities, combined with the obligation to 
report to the International Committee which, presumably, is en­
titled to comment on such reports, may be the beginning of a new 
era of education of both the military and the civili.an populations 
in that part of international criminal law which is concerned with 
breaches of the principles of international humanitarian law in 
time of armed conflict. 
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